A trial like no other - CYRIL ALMEIDA

A trial like no other
CYRIL ALMEIDA

CONVICT him. Lock him up in a cell and throw away the key. Let him get his comeuppance. Deterrence, justice, revenge — maybe it’s one, maybe it’s another, maybe it’s all three. Either way, the crime fits the man.

Or let him go. Everyone was on board in ’99. After ’07, he was gone in less than a year. It was, originally, a political crime — and the polity was his accomplice. Then, the polity moved on and that was that.

Musharraf. What are folk trying to get him for: seizing power or what he did with the power he seized?

The good thing about systems, the anti-coup democrats will argue, is that outcomes aren’t necessarily shaped by motives. Putting Musharraf on trial for the wrong reasons can still lead to the right outcome: less army influence, more civilian control.

The bad thing about systems, the realists will argue, is that outcomes aren’t necessarily shaped by motives. Putting Musharraf on trial for the right reasons can still lead to the wrong outcome: more civilian arrogance, more army antsiness.

But, first, we need to understand the system. And before that, because people populate the system, we need to understand the players.

There’s only one person who will make the decision whether Musharraf will be tried or not: Nawaz. And if anyone thinks he knows what Nawaz is thinking, he’s kidding himself. Like, really. The already notoriously closed-up has taken on a Sphinx-like air of mystery this time round.

Somewhere inside Nawaz is a decision-making centre that combines the personal with the visceral and a folksy understanding of systems. When you throw the Musharraf-trial complexities and angles and doubts and intentions into that decision-making centre, what will prevail in the end is anyone’s guess.

So expect to see Musharraf smoking a cigar in London soon or expect to see him on trial. Be surprised by neither.

But back to the system — because not knowing what Nawaz will decide doesn’t mean we can’t figure out what’s at stake.

Whether Musharraf is tried or not, the democratic project will continue. Nobody really thinks that a Musharraf trial would prompt Gen Sharif to oust PM Sharif.

Whether Musharraf is tried or not will though affect civil-military relations. If you can try a general — and not just any general, but one of the Club of Four — things change; power flows towards you some and away from the generals.

But there’s a third corner to this triangle, the one few ever focus on: the people.

It’s not just civil vs military or civ-mil imbalance; it’s civil and military seeking legitimacy and power from the people to control the state.

That contest is often cast as one rooted in results: when the civilians fail to deliver, intervention by the generals is accepted; when the generals end up covered in much of the same mud, a return to civilian options is embraced.

But the army gets away with it for a different reason (in addition to the fact that they have guns and are organised and are manipulative): an old, accepted and internalised tradition of a two-tiered governance system. Old enough to have its own entry in Encyclopaedia Britannica and its own name: dyarchy.

Essentially, running the state is divided into two halves: the authoritarian and the popularly responsible. It starts with weak institutions. Because they are weak, the pols are handed the softer stuff — education, health, jobs, small infrastructure — while the big boys keep a watchful gaze over the big-ticket items — security, revenue for state continuity, foreign policy.

Matters stumble along for a while. Then, when the pols inevitably stutter because institutions are weak and their own capacities limited, the big boys intervene, stepping in with their benign authoritarianism and smoothing things over.

But here’s the thing with dyarchy: it is not supposed to fundamentally fix things or transform realities. It is about stop-gap and backstop. It is about a system in which mediocre is considered safer than aiming for more. It is about saving from rather than aspiring to.

And it’s bloody hard to dislodge from the minds of everyone: the army, which believes in its benign-authoritarian mission as defender of the last resort; the pols, who deep down aren’t really convinced of their ability to fix stuff; and the people, who want better but will settle for OK.

Now plug a Musharraf trial into that system.

He deserves to be tried, he should be tried and it would be great to see him tried — for ’99. Even then, if ’07 is all the system can muster up the courage to try him for, it’s a compromise worth taking. Remember, the alternative is no trial, which the other three in the Club of Four got.

But from trial to no coup or more coup would be a stretch. For the system is dyarchy and the system is accepted. Benign authoritarianism by the army and about-par competence by the pols.

Turning that around, changing the system, would require first understanding what it is rooted in. Results matter, yes, but so do perceptions. Of the people.

Hand on their heart, most folk today would accept that the civilians are legitimate rulers and dictatorships a bad idea. But would they flat out reject the possibility of accepting another coup ever, no matter what the mitigating circumstances or justifications?

That’s modern-day dyarchy. And getting Musharraf will be a helluva lot easier than ever switching that around.

cyril.a@gmail.com

Twitter: @cyalm